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A COMPELLING INTEREST? USING OLD 
CONCEPTIONS OF PUBLIC HEALTH LAW TO 
CHALLENGE THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT’S 
CONTRACEPTIVE MANDATE 
Joshua Joel* 
INTRODUCTION 
The history of public health law exposes the best and worst of 
humanity. In this century, the Nazis justified genocide of millions to 
advance public health.1 At the same time, efforts of public health 
activists have saved millions from death and disease.2 Although 
public health aims could arguably justify near-totalitarian 
government control,3 governments have also used public health 
powers to ensure healthier air to breathe, water to drink, and food to 
eat.4 While personal liberties have been crushed through forced racist 
segregation and sterilization on the platform of advancing public 
health,5 similar curtailment of individual freedoms has saved nations 
                                                                                                                 
 *  J.D. Candidate, 2015, Georgia State University College of Law. I would like to extend a special 
thank you to Dean Kelly Timmons for her support and guidance; to Professor Leslie Wolf for starting 
me on this Note; to my wife—Sari—for the years of devotion as we have pursued our dreams; to my 
children—Rochel, Yaakov, and Nachum—for their joy and love; to my parents for their relentless love 
and support; and to the Creator for His endless blessings. 
 1. Virginia Leary et al., Health, Human Rights and International Law, 82 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 
PROC. 122, 134 (1990) (“The Nazis thought of the entire Nazi extermination program as a public health 
problem. Killing became a ‘therapeutic imperative.’”); Robert N. Proctor, Nazi Medicine and Public 
Health Policy, 10 DIMENSIONS 2 (1996), available at http://archive.adl.org/braun/dim_14_1_nazi_
med.asp (demonstrating that the Nazi worldview included a strong public health ethic, but “excluded 
Jews and others deemed racially or genetically unfit from the . . . community,” thereby justifying murder 
and torture by medical professionals). 
 2. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Achievements in Public Health, 1900–1999: Control of 
Infectious Diseases, 48 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 621, 621–629 (1999), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm4829a1.htm. 
 3. See Mark A. Hall, The Scope and Limits of Public Health Law, 46 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. 
S199, S208 (2003). 
 4. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 2. 
 5. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205, 207 (1927) (upholding the forced sterilization of a “feeble-
minded white woman” who may produce “‘inadequate offspring’” as constitutional because the welfare 
of society would be promoted); Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F. 10, 12–13 (N.D. Cal. 1900) (challenging 
the constitutionality of mandatory quarantine only enforced against Chinese people); Plessy v. Ferguson, 
163 U.S. 537, 540 (1896) (sustaining state anti-miscegenation laws, segregation in railroad 
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from disease through vaccination and quarantine.6 The study of 
public health must center on the tension between government 
coercive power and individual liberty.7 
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) touts 
“family planning” as one of the ten great public health achievements 
of the twentieth century.8 Nevertheless, the availability of 
contraception has long been at the center of political, social, and legal 
controversy.9 On March 23, 2010, this controversy came to a head 
when President Barack Obama signed the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (ACA or the Act).10 
One of the Act’s provisions, referred to as the “HHS Mandate,” 
requires health insurers to cover an essential benefits package, 
including prescription drugs.11 The Act delegates authority to the 
                                                                                                                 
transportation, and segregated schools); Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the “Old” Public Health: The 
Legal Framework for the Regulation of Public Health, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1421, 1424–25 (2004); Paul 
A. Lombardo, Medicine, Eugenics, and the Supreme Court: From Coercive Sterilization to 
Reproductive Freedom, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 4 (1996). 
 6. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31–32 n.† (1905) (showing evidence of the efficacy 
of vaccination); Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Achievements in Public Health, 1900–1999 
Impact of Vaccines Universally Recommended for Children—United States, 1990–1998, 48 MORBIDITY 
& MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 243, 243–48 (1999), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/
mmwrhtml/00056803.htm (describing the impacts of recommended vaccination on the population); 
Epstein, supra note 5, at 1445–47. 
 7. See LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 10–11 (2nd ed. 
2008) (noting that protecting the community’s health is not possible without limiting many private 
activities) [hereinafter GOSTIN, POWER]. 
 8. Ten Great Public Health Achievements in the 20th Century, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION (Oct. 13, 2014, 7:38 PM), http://www.cdc.gov/about/history/tengpha.htm. Other 
achievements include vaccination, motor-vehicle safety, safer workplaces, control of infectious diseases, 
decline in deaths from heart disease and stroke, safer and healthier foods, fluoridation of water, and 
public awareness of the hazards of tobacco use. Id. The CDC claims that decreased family size and 
ability to space births has improved women’s role in society and contributed to the better health of the 
family. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Achievements in Public Health, 1900–1999: Family 
Planning, 48 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1073, 1073 (1999), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm4847a1.htm. 
 9. See Erica S. Mellick, Time for Plan B: Increasing Access to Emergency Contraception and 
Minimizing Conflicts of Conscience, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 402, 405–11 (2006). 
 10. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010); Sheryl 
Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, Obama Signs Health Care Overhaul Bill, With a Flourish, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 23, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/health/policy/24health.html; Robert Pear, 
Contraceptives Stay Covered in Health Law, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/06/29/us/politics/final-rule-issued-for-contraceptive-coverage.html. 
 11. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a) (2012) (requiring health insurers to provide minimum no-cost coverage 
for “evidence-based” preventive services according to guidelines by United States Preventive Services 
Task Force, CDC, and HHS). HHS delegated to the Institute of Medicine (IOM) the job of 
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Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to determine what 
prescription drugs the HHS Mandate includes.12 The HHS definition 
embraces all FDA-approved preventive care drugs including 
contraceptives such as Plan B (“morning-after pill”),13 Ella (“week-
after pill”),14 and two intrauterine devices (IUDs) that can prevent the 
implantation of a fertilized egg.15 Employers who provide insurance 
and do not comply with the mandate are subject to heavy fines.16 
Strong objection by the Roman Catholic Church and other 
religious groups prompted HHS to amend its guidelines and exempt 
non-profit religious institutions from the provision.17 Nonetheless, 
                                                                                                                 
recommending guidelines for this purpose. Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to 
Coverage of Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 
8725, 8726 (proposed Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45 C.F.R. pt. 147). IOM’s 
report recommended the guidelines to include “‘[a]ll Food and Drug Administration [(FDA)] approved 
contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling for all women 
with reproductive capacity.’” Id. 
 12. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012) (“[W]ith respect to women, such additional preventive 
care . . . as provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health Resources and Services 
Administration”); 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv) (2013). 
 13. See Birth Control: Medicines to Help You, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
ForConsumers/ByAudience/ForWomen/FreePublications/ucm313215.htm (last updated Jan. 8, 2015). 
 14. See id. 
 15. 77 Fed. Reg. 8725; Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1123 (10th Cir. 2013) 
(describing the contraceptives at issue). 
 16. See 26 U.S.C. § 4980D(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-36) (imposing a tax of “$100 for 
each day in the noncompliance period with respect to each individual to whom such failure relates.”); 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775–76 (2014). (“For Hobby Lobby, the bill 
could amount to $1.3 million per day or about $475 million per year; for Conestoga, the assessment 
could be $90,000 per day or $33 million per year; and for Mardel, it could be $40,000 per day or about 
$15 million per year.”). 
 17. 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(A) (2013); Coverage of Certain Preventative Services Under the 
Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 8456, 8458 (Feb. 6, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 147, 148, 
and 156); Brady Sullivan, HHS Issues Another Rule on Contraceptive Mandate, REGBLOG (July 10, 
2013), http://www.law.upenn.edu/blogs/regblog/2013/07/10-sullivan-contraceptive-mandate.html 
(indicating that outrage from “[r]eligious rights advocacy groups and the Catholic Church” caused HHS 
to issue new rules “seeking to accommodate religious non-profits.”). Other religious groups—even those 
not doctrinally opposed to contraception—have aligned themselves with the Catholic Church’s 
objections because of the religious freedom implications. Howard Slugh, Rabbis Side with Catholics, 
Urge Obama to Drop Mandate, WKLY. STANDARD (May 24, 2012, 12:19 PM), 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/rabbis-side-catholics-urge-obama-drop-mandate_645819.html 
(“Rabbinical Council of America (RCA), the largest organization of rabbis in the United States, 
approved a resolution recognizing that the Health and Human Services . . . forces many employers to 
‘violate the injunctions of their religion.’”); Timothy George & Chuck Colson, First They Came for the 
Catholics: Obama’s Contraceptive Mandate, CHRISTIANITY TODAY (Feb. 8, 2012, 10:10 AM), 
http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2012/februaryweb-only/catholics-contraceptive-mandate.html 
(urging evangelicals to “stand unequivocally with our Roman Catholic brothers and sisters,” reasoning 
that “when the government violates the religious liberty of one group, it threatens the religious liberty of 
3
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religious groups were unsatisfied.18 As a result, over 126 non-profit 
plaintiffs and 193 for-profit corporation plaintiffs filed lawsuits 
challenging the mandate’s constitutionality.19 The circuit courts split 
in the cases decided on their merits, and the cases were appealed to 
the United States Supreme Court.20 
In a landmark ruling, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., the 
Supreme Court held that closely held, for-profit corporations are 
entitled to free-exercise rights, and a regulation restricting the 
religious activities of a corporation must comply with the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).21 The Obama administration had 
claimed that contraception coverage is a vital preventive care service 
within the government’s coercive authority to advance public 
health.22 Although the Burwell majority criticized this argument,23 
the Court found it “unnecessary to adjudicate this issue” and assumed 
                                                                                                                 
all.”); Asma T. Uddin & Ashley McGuire, It’s About Religious Liberty, Not Birth Control, ONFAITH 
(Mar. 7, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/altmuslimah/post/beyond-the-war-on-women-its-
about-religious-liberty-not-birth-control/2012/03/06/gIQAK5ArwR_blog.html (advocating Muslim 
women to “stand united” with Catholic women “in opposition to the mandate and the affront on 
religious freedom it so gravely poses” even though Islam disagrees with Catholic doctrine about 
morality of contraception, sterilization, and abortifacients). 
 18. Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Religious Freedom and Women’s Health—The Litigation on 
Contraception, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 4, 4 (2013). See also Press Release, United States Conference of 
Catholic Bishops, HHS Final Rule Still Requires Action in Congress, By Courts, Says Cardinal Dolan 
(July 3, 2013), available at http://www.usccb.org/news/2013/13-137.cfm. 
 19. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby Stores, 723 F.3d 1114; Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of 
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, 724 F.3d 377 (3rd Cir. 2013), rev’d, Burwell; Korte v. Sebelius, 
735 F.3d 654, 655 (7th Cir. 2013); HHS Mandate Information Central, http://www.becketfund.org/
hhsinformationcentral (last visited Sept. 16, 2013). In general, plaintiffs argue that requiring religious 
employers to provide contraception against their religious beliefs violates their constitutional right to 
free exercise of religion. Id. 
 20. See Hobby Lobby Stores, 723 F.3d at 1120 (holding that a for-profit corporation can assert a 
free-exercise claim); Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 381 (holding that a for-profit, secular corporation cannot 
engage in religious exercise); Gilardi v. HHS, 733 F.3d 1208, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (finding that 
although secular corporations are not afforded free exercise rights, the contraceptive mandate 
“trammels” the constitutional right to free exercise of religion of the shareholders); Korte, 735 F.3d at 
686; Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618, 628 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding that for-profit corporation 
is not a “person” to engage in religion); Eden Foods Inc. vs. Sebelius, 733 F.3d 626, 633 (6th Cir. 2013) 
(holding that a corporation could not assert a religious freedom claim). 
 21. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2775. See discussion infra Part III.D. 
 22. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *27–*28, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1536 
(2014) (No. 13-354), 2013 WL 5290575, at *27–*28 (Sept. 19, 2013). 
 23. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2779 (“[M]any of these [interests] are couched in very broad terms, such 
as promoting ‘public health’ and ‘gender equality.’ RFRA, however, contemplates a ‘more focused’ 
inquiry . . . .”). 
4
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 4
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol31/iss3/4
2015] A COMPELLING INTEREST 617 
“that the interest in guaranteeing cost-free access to the four 
challenged contraceptive methods is compelling within the meaning 
of RFRA.”24 
As demonstrated by Burwell, courts often do not to engage in 
critical analysis of public health legal doctrine because cases can 
often be resolved within a more formalistic legal framework.25 A 
more rigorous public health analysis could provide a more 
predictable framework by which courts could weigh the competing 
interests implicated by public health legislation and regulation, as 
well as provide tools to agencies to ensure the legality of their 
actions. Additionally, it could serve to remove the politicization of 
regulatory decision-making by vetting those actions within a 
preconceived framework. Therefore, the purpose of this Note is to 
suggest a framework by which public health initiatives should be 
analyzed when they conflict with religious freedoms.26 
Part I of this Note presents arguments for and against the notion 
that mandating contraceptive coverage is an important public health 
initiative.27 Part II defines and delineates the scope of public health.28 
                                                                                                                 
 24. Id. at 2780, 2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“It is important to confirm that a premise of the 
Court’s opinion is its assumption that the HHS regulation here at issue furthers a legitimate and 
compelling interest in the health of female employees.”). Conservative scholar, Richard A. Epstein, has 
criticized this assumption as an “intellectual and tactical mistake.” See Richard A. Epstein, The Defeat 
of the Contraceptive Mandate in Hobby Lobby: Right Results, Wrong Reasons, 2014 CATO SUP. CT. 
REV. 35, 50 (2014). 
 25. See Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2780; WENDY E. PARMET, POPULATIONS, PUBLIC HEALTH, & THE 
LAW 5–6 (2009) [hereinafter PARMET, POPULATIONS] (arguing that “despite the ubiquity of public 
health issues in law,” theorists and courts overlook the “centrality of public health issues” in their 
analysis and decisions, and do not appreciate the insight the field of public health may “bring to the 
legal question at hand.”). The district courts that struck down the contraceptive mandate also only relied 
on the fact that the government only provided general public health interests that were insufficient to 
fulfill the “compelling interest” standard. See Hobby Lobby Stores, 723 F.3d at 1143 (holding that the 
interests of public health and gender inequality are insufficient because they are too broadly 
formulated); Gilardi, 733 F.3d at 1220 (stating that the government’s public health “recitation is sketchy 
and highly abstract”); Korte, 735 F.3d at 686 (holding that the government’s arguments “flunk the test” 
because the interests were stated too generally). See also Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 412 (Jordan, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the Obama administration did not satisfy the RFRA because only general 
health interests were asserted). 
 26. This Note does not, however, touch the primary controversy in the Burwell case: whether 
corporations have religious freedom at all. See, e.g., Emily Carlton Cook, How the Meaning of 
Incorporation over Time Lends Support for Corporate Free Exercise Rights, 48 GA. L. REV. 1149, 1154 
(2014). 
 27. See discussion infra Part I. 
 28. See discussion infra Part II. 
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Part III approaches public health in the legal context: first, it 
delineates the federal government’s constitutional power to enforce 
public health interests; second, it establishes a framework for 
evaluating public health initiatives; and third, it presents the standard 
by which courts balance public health interests against incursion on 
freedom of religion.29 Finally, Part IV suggests that the Jacobson 
factors presented in Part III should be used as a tool to assess whether 
a compelling interest exists when the federal government enacts 
legislation that restricts religious freedom, and analyzes the 
contraceptive mandate to demonstrate the benefit of such an 
analysis.30 
I.   THE POLICY DEBATE: IS MANDATORY CONTRACEPTIVE COVERAGE 
THE APPROPRIATE PRESCRIPTION? 
The underlying goal driving the ACA’s preventive care coverage 
requirement is the effort to transform the healthcare system from one 
that treats illness to one that sustains health.31 The ACA considers 
contraception to be a part of basic preventive care for women and 
therefore requires coverage without copayments.32 Mandating 
contraceptive coverage is not new; before the ACA, twenty-eight 
states had already required insurers to cover contraceptives, twenty of 
which exempted certain employers and insurers.33 
                                                                                                                 
 29. See discussion infra Part III. 
 30. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 31. Dana R. Gossett et al., Contraception Is a Fundamental Primary Care Service, 309 JAMA 1997, 
1997 (2013); Jost, supra note 18, at 4 (noting that the preventive care chapters of the ACA reflect health 
policy experts’ view that healthcare should proactively “prevent disease and preserve wellness”). 
 32. See 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8726; Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2787–88 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Adam 
Sonfield, The Case for Insurance Coverage of Contraceptive Services and Supplies Without Cost 
Sharing, GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV., Winter 2011, at 7, 7, available at http://www.guttmacher.org/
pubs/gpr/14/1/gpr140107.pdf (claiming that “a strong, long-standing body of evidence” shows that 
contraception has long been considered part of preventive public health care). 
 33. State Policies in Brief: Insurance Coverage of Contraceptives, GUTTMACHER INST. 2 (Oct. 
2014), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_ICC.pdf. Three states limit contraceptive 
coverage refusals to churches and church associations but not hospitals or other entities. Id. Seven states 
expand coverage refusals to include churches, church associations, religious schools, and some religious 
charities and universities. Id. Nine others allow all religious organizations to refuse to provide coverage, 
including some hospitals. Id. At least one of these states exempts even secular organizations with “moral 
or religious” objections. Id. The federal mandate contains a “religious employer” exception and defines 
6
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A.   Arguments in Favor of the Contraceptive Mandate 
Contraceptive mandates originated as a women’s rights issue, but 
proponents also argue that mandates provide “direct, positive” effects 
on improving the health of women and infants.34 The primary use of 
contraception is to prevent pregnancy.35 The rate of unintended 
pregnancies in the United States is higher than in other developed 
countries,36 particularly among low-income women, women in their 
teens and early twenties, and minorities.37 One way to minimize 
unintended pregnancies is to expand access to contraceptive care.38 
Therefore, mandate supporters argue that preventing unwanted 
pregnancies is an important public health initiative.39 
                                                                                                                 
it as a nonprofit organization that “primarily employs persons who share the religious tenets of the 
organization,” “serves primarily persons who share the religious tenets of the organization,” and whose 
purpose is to inculcate “religious values.” 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(B) (2013). The federal 
exemption is modeled after those of California, New York, and Oregon, which are the narrowest of all 
the state exemptions. Six Things Everyone Should Know About the HHS Mandate, U.S. CONF. OF 
CATHOLIC BISHOPS (Feb. 6, 2012), http://www.usccb.org/news/2012/12-021.cfm. 
 34. BEBE J. ANDERSON & LYNNE S. WILCOX, Reproductive Health, in LAW IN PUBLIC HEALTH 
PRACTICE 348, 363 (Richard A. Goodman et al. eds., 2003); Sonfield, supra note 32, at 8 (stating that the 
“most direct, positive effects” of helping couples plan pregnancy are improved “maternal and child 
health outcomes”). Arguments in favor of contraceptive mandates gained traction in the mid-1990’s 
after insurance companies began providing coverage for Viagra for men. Susan J. Stabile, State Attempts 
to Define Religion: The Ramifications of Applying Mandatory Prescription Contraceptive Coverage 
Statutes to Religious Employers, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 741, 741 (2005). Women’s rights groups 
argued that providing coverage for contraception would balance the inequality of access to reproductive 
health services. Lisa A. Hayden, Gender Discrimination Within the Reproductive Health Care System: 
Viagra v. Birth Control, 13 J.L. & HEALTH 172–73 (1999). In fact, the U.S. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission ruled that employers’ failure to provide equal coverage to prescription drugs 
to men and women violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Anderson & Wilcox, supra at 363 no. i. 
 35. Gossett et al., supra note 31, at 1997. 
 36. Id. (citing Susheela Singh et al., Unintended Pregnancy: Worldwide Levels, Trends, and 
Outcomes, 41 STUD. FAM. PLAN. 241, 241–50 (2010)). Unwanted pregnancies are defined as those that 
occur two or more years earlier than desired or those that are not wanted at all. Susheela Singh et al., 
supra, at 242 (2010). It is estimated that there are over 3 million unintended pregnancies in the United 
States annually. Gossett et al., supra note 31, at 1997 (citing Singh et al., supra, at 241–50). 
 37. Lawrence B. Finer & Stanley K. Henshaw, Disparities in Rates of Unintended Pregnancies in 
the United States, 1994 and 2001, 38 PERSP. ON SEXUAL AND REPROD. HEALTH 90, 92–94 (2006) 
(demonstrating by empirical evidence that these groups have the most unintended pregnancies). 
 38. Singh et al., supra note 36, at 248 (suggesting based upon epidemiological data that increased 
access to contraceptive use decreases unintended pregnancy rates). 
 39. Gossett et al., supra note 31, at 1997. 
7
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1.   The Problem: The Effects of Unintended Pregnancy 
In its report, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) based its 
recommendation on the argument that “unintended pregnancies have 
adverse health consequences for both mothers and children.”40 
Maternal mortality and risks associated with pregnancy are higher in 
unplanned pregnancies.41 The IOM found that consequences of 
unplanned pregnancies include inadequate prenatal care, depression, 
higher likelihood of smoking or consuming alcohol during 
pregnancy, and increased likelihood of preterm birth and low birth 
weight.42 Contraception also lowers abortion rates.43 The report 
further found that spacing pregnancies decreases the risk for adverse 
pregnancy outcomes and allows for women with chronic medical 
conditions to delay conception.44 
Additionally, supporters urge that availability of contraception also 
provides non-contraceptive medical benefits.45 For example, women 
use contraceptives to treat menstrual disorders and even acne; 
contraceptive pills have also been known to reduce the risk of 
ovarian and endometrial cancer.46 Lastly, supporters argue that 
                                                                                                                 
 40. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1536 (2014) 
(No. 13-354), 2013 WL 5290575, at *6 (Sept. 19, 2013). 
 41. Gossett et al., supra note 31, at 1997. The specific argument is that the risk of death from oral 
contraceptive use is only 1 in 1,667,000, “roughly the same risk as being struck by lightning,” whereas 
15 of 100,000 women die in childbirth. Id. 
 42. INST. OF MED, COMM. ON PREVENTIVE SERVS. FOR WOMEN, CLINICAL PREVENTIVE SERVICES 
FOR WOMEN: CLOSING THE GAPS 103 (2011), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php? 
record_id=13181. Contrary to the IOM report and the Guttmacher Institute’s arguments, studies in the 
United States indicate that although most women who become pregnant unintentionally delay antenatal 
care, once the pregnancy is discovered there is little discrepancy between intended and unintended 
pregnancies. Jessica D. Gipson et al., The Effects of Unintended Pregnancy on Infant, Child, and 
Parental Health: A Review of the Literature, 39 STUD. FAM. PLAN. 18, 22–23 (2008). Additionally, 
many studies exist regarding the effect of unintended pregnancy on the risk of “congenital anomalies, 
spontaneous abortion, premature delivery, and low birth weight,” and the studies have produced mixed 
results. Id. at 24. A few studies in developed countries have found a correlation between unintended 
pregnancies and “maternal risk behaviors, including alcohol and illicit drug use, cigarette smoking, and 
caffeine intake.” Id. at 21. But, three “large, rigorous” studies in the United States found that maternal 
risk behaviors are not effected by pregnancy intention. Id. at 22. 
 43. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 40, at 7. 
 44. INST. OF MED., supra note 42, at 103. 
 45. Gossett et al., supra note 31, at 1997. 
 46. INST. OF MED., supra note 42, at 107; Gossett et al., supra note 31, at 1997 (listing 
“menorrhagia, dysmenorrhea, and chronic pelvic pain” among the non-pregnancy ailments often treated 
with contraceptive pills). 
8
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women receive social benefits from contraceptive use; pregnancy 
planning frees women to pursue higher education, professional 
opportunities, and financial security before establishing a family.47 
2.   The Solution: Easier and Cheaper Access to Contraceptive 
Care 
Proponents of the contraceptive mandate argue that providing no-
cost contraceptive care is the best way to address the problem of 
unwanted pregnancies.48 They point to statistics showing that 
increased contraceptive use parallels declines in unintended 
pregnancy and abortion.49 Also, improved access to contraceptives 
through expanded family planning programs in states like California 
and Arkansas precipitated a sharp decline in abortions and 
unintended pregnancies.50 The argument is that reducing cost will 
instigate greater usage of the most common and effective 
contraceptives, the pill and sterilization, and therefore the number of 
unintended pregnancies will decline.51 
B.   Arguments Against the Contraceptive Mandate 
The mandate’s opponents attack this chain of reasoning and 
suggest that contraceptive mandates are ineffective in the face of the 
“unique qualities of the sexual transaction,” and that easy access to 
contraception may potentially increase unwanted pregnancy by 
increasing the demand for sex outside of marriage.52 Further, the 
mandate’s opponents argue that the mandate will likely do little to 
                                                                                                                 
 47. Gossett et al., supra note 31, at 1997–98 (arguing non-medical benefits of contraception). 
 48. Sonfield, supra note 32, at 7 (arguing that contraceptive coverage is a low-cost way of 
addressing the “daunting barrier” low-income women face in accessing contraception). 
 49. INST. OF MED., supra note 42, at 105; Sonfield, supra note 32, at 8 (claiming increased 
contraceptive use is responsible for a seventy-seven percent decline in pregnancies among 15–17 year 
olds from 1995 to 2002). 
 50. Sonfield, supra note 32, at 8. In California, 2,870,000 unintended pregnancies and 118,000 
abortions were avoided. Id. Arkansas saw an eighty-four percent drop in repeat births within twelve 
months. Id. 
 51. INST. OF MED., supra note 42, at 108–09. 
 52. Helen M. Alvaré, No Compelling Interest: The “Birth Control” Mandate and Religious 
Freedom, 58 VILL. L. REV. 379, 380 (2013) [hereinafter Alvaré, No Compelling Interest]. 
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decrease unwanted pregnancies because low-income women, who 
represent the highest number of unwanted pregnancies, are already 
“amply supplied with free or low-cost contraception” by state and 
federal governments.53 Women’s failure to access this contraception 
indicates that their reasons for not using contraceptives have less to 
do with cost than with other factors that are not affected by the 
mandate.54 
Perhaps the most salient argument against the contraceptive 
mandate is that its sole basis, the IOM report, is flawed.55 First, 
throughout its treatment of statistical evidence, the report fails to 
prove causation between unwanted pregnancy and health problems 
and does “no more than suggest correlation.”56 In fact, the reality 
might be the reverse; it is highly plausible that a woman’s 
predisposition to risk-taking accounts for both unintended 
pregnancies and problems such as smoking and drinking during 
pregnancy.57 Opponents also argue that increased access to oral 
contraception may even damage women’s health because some 
                                                                                                                 
 53. Id. Alvaré notes that most low-income women already have access to contraception through 
Medicaid and other government programs and fail to use it. Id. at 425. See also 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396d(a)(4)(C) (including “family planning” as a Medicaid benefit for women of child-bearing age 
who are sexually active). 
 54. Alvaré, No Compelling Interest, supra note 52, at 380. 
 55. Id. at 391 (arguing that the IOM report’s conclusions are flawed and cannot support the 
government’s claim, and pointing out that the IOM furnished nearly the entire basis of the mandate). 
Alvaré, in a separate article, asserts that the report was “crafted by hard-line ideological partisans,” who 
were “pre-committed to the results they ultimately advocated,” and only heard from witnesses who 
“were similarly ideologically committed.” Helen Alvaré, Bad Science and Failed Freedom Protections 
in the HHS Mandate, PUB. DISCOURSE (Feb. 5, 2013), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com
/2013/02/7847. Catholic hospitals, the largest nonprofit health care provider in the United States, were 
not invited to testify. Id. Indeed, one of the primary studies relied upon in the IOM was crafted by a 
senior fellow of the Guttmacher Institute, an affiliate of Planned Parenthood, who is a longtime 
supporter of large-scale birth control and abortion. Alvaré, No Compelling Interest, supra note 52, at 
399. 
 56. Alvaré, No Compelling Interest, supra note 52, at 393. In fact, the actual texts of the studies cited 
by the IOM only claim “association” and do not assert causation at all. Id. at 393. See also supra note 
42. Sources cited in the report are irrelevant to claims asserted, and at least one of the primary statistical 
studies used have been negatively peer reviewed. Alvaré, No Compelling Interest, supra note 52, at 393. 
The report cites a study about gestational diabetes and cardiovascular disease to support an assertion 
about low birth weight in children. Id. One review of a study used stated that it was based on 
“questionable assumptions” and the numbers “may be considerably inflated.” Id. at 396 (citing Austin L. 
Hughes, The Case for a Compelling Government Interest in the HHS Mandate: Examining the Scientific 
Evidence (Dec. 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)). 
 57. Alvaré, No Compelling Interest, supra note 52, at 414. 
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studies have shown that increased access to contraception has 
increased the rates of sexually transmitted diseases.58 Regarding 
children’s health, opponents argue better protection is afforded by 
“encouraging mothers to seek prenatal care, breastfeed, and avoid 
smoking and drinking during pregnancy” and not by preventing 
births.59 
Second, even assuming the IOM’s report is methodologically 
sound, opponents question the argument that access to contraception 
can reduce unwanted pregnancy.60 The government can merely 
provide access, but cannot force a woman to use contraception.61 In 
fact, women do not use contraception for many reasons, many of 
which are not cost-related.62 For example, studies have shown that 
the perception of low risk for pregnancy is the primary reason for not 
using birth control.63 The IOM itself, in both 1995 and 2010, claimed 
that “despite the availability of safe and effective preventive 
methods,” there was little progress in preventing unwanted 
pregnancy.64 
Although there are unquestionably two sides to the policy coin 
regarding the contraceptive mandate, it is insufficient to rely on 
policy alone in determining whether a public health action is an 
appropriate use of government coercive power.65 For that purpose, 
                                                                                                                 
 58. Id. at 414–15. 
 59. Id. at 392. The United States Preventive Task Force, a panel of experts that research preventative 
health measure, already requires these services to be provided to the insured cost-free. Id. (citing 42 
U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2006)). 
 60. Id. at 396 (analyzing and criticizing each step of the logic supporting the HHS mandate). 
 61. Id. at 398. 
 62. Id. at 383–84. One study, for example, found that over seventy-five percent of women did not 
use contraception because they “did not expect to have sex” or “did not think they could get pregnant.” 
William Mosher et al., Predictors of Non-use of Contraception, and Reasons for Non-use: Key Factors 
Affecting Unintended Pregnancy in the United States, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS 9, available 
at http://paa2012.princeton.edu/papers/122088. 
 63. Mosher, supra note 62, at 9. Another study showed that simple ambivalence about pregnancy is 
strongly connected to non-use of contraception. Jennifer J. Frost et al., Factors Associated with 
Contraceptive Use and Nonuse, United States, 2004, 39 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 90, 97 
(2007). 
 64. Alvaré, No Compelling Interest, supra note 52, at 400 (internal citation omitted). 
 65. See PARMET, POPULATIONS, supra note 25, at 28–45 (discussing the centrality of law to the 
public health debate). 
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attention must be given to the limitations and scope of public health 
in a legal framework. 
II.   THE DEFINITION AND SCOPE OF PUBLIC HEALTH 
“Public health” is a challenging concept to define, and an effort to 
encapsulate its entire spectrum is difficult.66 Charles-Edward A. 
Winslow, an early public health scholar, defined public health as “the 
science and art of preventing disease, prolonging life, and promoting 
physical health and efficiency through organised community 
efforts.”67 While the medical care system treats individual patients, 
the public health system’s “patient” is the entire community, focusing 
on the wellbeing of a population.68 
Additionally, the breadth of how “health” is defined greatly affects 
the question of whether an initiative appropriately reaches public 
health aims.69 The narrowest view of public health focuses on “the 
immediate risk factors for injury and disease.”70 This definition limits 
public health to government intervention, specifically public officials 
“taking appropriate measures pursuant to specific legal 
authority . . . to protect the health of the public.”71 It also limits 
public health duties to “discrete powers such as 
surveillance . . . injury prevention . . . and infectious disease 
                                                                                                                 
 66. Id. at 7 (“Despite the frequent use of the term public health, the phrase is surprisingly difficult to 
define.”); PUBLIC HEALTH LAW & ETHICS 1–8 (Lawrence O. Gostin, ed., 2nd ed. 2010) [hereinafter 
PUBLIC HEALTH LAW & ETHICS]; Lawrence O. Gostin et al., The Law and the Public’s Health, in LAW 
IN PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE 3, 4 (Richard A. Goodman et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter Gostin, Public’s 
Health] (“The effort to capture the entire spectrum of public health activity in one definition is bound to 
be complex and challenging.”); Mark A. Rothstein, Rethinking the Meaning of Public Health, 30 J.L. 
MED. & ETHICS 144, 144–47 (2002) (advancing three alternative definitions of public health). 
 67. ROBERT BEAGLEHOLE & RUTH BONITA, PUBLIC HEALTH AT THE CROSSROADS: ACHIEVEMENTS 
AND PROSPECTS 174 (2nd ed. 2004) (quoting Charles-Edward A. Winslow). 
 68. Gostin, Public’s Health, supra note 66, at 5; PARMET, POPULATIONS, supra note 25, at 8. For 
example, to address the serious public health concerns of cigarette smoking, the medical-care system 
treats and counsels individuals regarding lung cancer, emphysema, and heart disease, whereas a public 
health approach focuses on changing social norms and preventing tobacco addiction. Gostin, Public’s 
Health, supra note 66, at 4. 
 69. PARMET, POPULATIONS, supra note 25, at 7–9. 
 70. PUBLIC HEALTH HAW & ETHICS, supra note 66, at 3. 
 71. Rothstein, supra note 66, at 146. 
12
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 4
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol31/iss3/4
2015] A COMPELLING INTEREST 625 
control.”72 A more expansive view focuses on the general health of 
the population, and enlists the community as a whole—both private 
and public sectors—in the effort.73 This view focuses on the 
“empirical and ethical relationship between the health of individuals 
and the well-being of their communities.”74 
The World Health Organization views public health more 
expansively as a “state of complete physical, mental, and social well-
being,” which broadens the horizon of public health initiatives to 
cover virtually any program to promote human happiness.75 
However, according to the dictionary definition of health—”the state 
of being sound in body or mind” 76—only those initiatives that 
promote the proper and efficient functioning of people’s mental or 
physical health are justified.77 Even according to this slightly 
narrower definition, however, public health could arguably be viewed 
to include any initiative that creates an environment more conducive 
to healthy living.78 
Finally, the most expansive definition focuses on the 
“socioeconomic foundations of health” and human rights.79 
According to this view, public health may reach such social issues as 
distribution of wealth, war, racial equality, civic duties, and lifestyle, 
                                                                                                                 
 72. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW & ETHICS, supra note 66, at 3–4. 
 73. PARMET, POPULATIONS, supra note 25, at 14; Rothstein, supra note 66, at 145. 
 74. PARMET, POPULATIONS, supra note 25, at 14. 
 75. Id. at 7–8 (observing that WHO’s definition “equate[s] health with the totality of human 
happiness,” and inferring from that definition that public health would “necessarily encompass an 
extremely broad set of activities, including all collective actions undertaken to provide the conditions for 
human happiness”) See also WORLD HEALTH ORG., Constitution of the World Health Organization 1, 
http://www.who.int/governance/eb/who_constitution_en.pdf (defining public health). 
 76. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1043 (1986). 
 77. See PARMET, POPULATIONS, supra note 25, at 7–8 (demonstrating that the dictionary definition 
of “health” affects the understanding of the scope of public health). The United States Supreme Court 
took this limited dictionary-definition view of public health to interpret and limit the scope of 
environmental regulation, and blatantly rejected the view that public health referred to “preventive 
medicine, organized care of the sick, etc.” Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 465–66 
(2001) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court rather interpreted public health to simply mean “the health 
of the public.” Id. at 466. 
 78. PARMET, POPULATIONS, supra note 25, at 8 (noting that according to the IOM’s definition, 
public health translates to what we do to “ensure the conditions for people’s bodies” to perform 
properly). But see Epstein, supra note 5, at 1425–26 (arguing for a far more limited definition of public 
health, which focuses on prevention of only those “public bads” that can be inflicted on another with 
consent); Hall, supra note 3, at S208 (limiting public health to the more “traditional” approach). 
 79. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW & ETHICS, supra note 66, at 4; Rothstein, supra note 66, at 144. 
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because they are “important factors in individual well-being and 
community functioning.”80 
III.   PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: THE LIMITATIONS OF GOVERNMENT 
AUTHORITY AND REACH 
“Critical elements” by which public health objectives are achieved 
are government legislation and regulation.81 Therefore, the public 
health system falls into inevitable contact—and sometimes conflict—
with the legal system.82 For example, mandatory vaccinations prevent 
and diagnose outbreak of disease, but implicate rights to personal 
autonomy, bodily integrity, or religious freedom.83 Similarly, 
prohibitions against public smoking prevent personal injury, but 
implicate freedom of association.84 Even emissions-control or other 
environmental regulation may promote a healthy habitat for human 
life, but can encroach on individual property rights.85 
The Framers viewed the government’s duty to protect the health 
and welfare of the public as one of its primary purposes in its 
responsibility to advance the common good of its citizens,86 but they 
                                                                                                                 
 80. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW & ETHICS, supra note 66, at 4. This last view is gaining popularity, and 
public health practitioners have even used it to justify involvement in city planning, safe housing, diet, 
exercise, violence, war, and racial discrimination. Id. 
 81. Stephen L. Isaacs, Where the Public Good Prevailed, 12 AM. PROSPECT, no. 10, June 2001, 
available at http://prospect.org/article/where-public-good-prevailed. 
 82. Gostin, Public’s Health, supra note 66, at 3. 
 83. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905) (holding a mandatory vaccination statute 
to be constitutional even though the plaintiff argued that vaccinations violated his religious principles 
and personal autonomy); GOSTIN, POWER, supra note 7, at 44. 
 84. See Am. Legion Post #149 v. Wash. State Dep’t of Health, 192 P.3d 306, 324–25 (Wash. 2008) 
(holding that restricting individuals’ freedom to smoke in private facility to enhance the public health 
does not interfere with freedom of association because smoking is not a fundamental right or liberty); 
Tucson v. Grezaffi, 23 P.3d 675, 681 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that ordinance forbidding public 
smoking in restaurants did not violate an individual’s right to freedom of association and was 
constitutional because it was a rational, legitimate means of safeguarding the general health, safety, and 
welfare of the community); GOSTIN, POWER, supra note 7, at 44. 
 85. GOSTIN, POWER, supra note 7, at 46. See also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 
1019 (1992) (holding that legislation constitutes an unconstitutional taking when it causes an individual 
to sacrifice all beneficial use of the land for the sake of the common good); Terry W. Frazier, Protecting 
Ecological Integrity Within the Balancing Function of Property Law, 28 ENVTL. L. 53, 53 (1998) (noting 
the tension between ecologically-based property rules and property law values). 
 86. See U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We . . . , in order to . . . promote the general Welfare . . . do ordain and 
establish this Constitution”); Wendy E. Parmet, Health Care and the Constitution: Public Health and 
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also inculcated profound protections of personal liberty in the 
Constitution.87 Therefore, typical public health law discussion seeks 
to ascertain the balance between positive power of government to act 
on behalf of its citizens’ health and restraining that power to protect 
individual rights, liberty, and freedom.88 
A.   States’ Power to Mandate Public Health Initiatives 
It has long been settled that regulation and legislation to protect the 
public health falls under the traditional state police powers.89 The 
police powers refer to government authority to limit or even 
eliminate certain private interests to promote comfort, health, morals, 
or prosperity, as embodied in the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non 
laedas, which means “use your property in such a manner as not to 
injure that of another.”90 Discretion is afforded to the sovereign to 
                                                                                                                 
the Role of the State in the Framing Era, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 267, 270 (1992) (arguing that “[t]he 
framing generation assumed that governments had a significant role to play in protecting health and 
providing care to the ill,” and that the framers saw “that governments were empowered to protect and, 
therefore, legitimate only when they protected the public health.”). 
 87. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 88. PARMET, POPULATIONS, supra note 25, at 31. Lawrence Gostin, a preeminent scholar on public 
health law, offers a nuanced definition of public health law reflecting the values of law: 
Public health law is the study of the legal powers and duties of the state, in collaboration 
with its partners . . . to ensure the conditions for people to be healthy . . . and of the 
limitations on the power of the state to constrain for the common good the autonomy, 
privacy, liberty, proprietary, and other legally protected interests of individuals. The 
prime objective of public health law is to pursue the highest possible level of physical 
and mental health in the population, consistent with the values of social justice. 
GOSTIN, POWER, supra note 7, at 4. 
 89. Cf. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 203 (1824) (referring to the police powers as “that immense 
mass of legislation, which embraces every thing within the territory of a State . . . all which can be most 
advantageously exercised by the States themselves. Inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of 
every description . . . are component parts of this mass.”); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 
(1905) (holding that “the police power of a state must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable 
regulations established directly by legislative enactment as will protect the public health and the public 
safety”). 
 90. Gostin, Public’s Health, supra note 66, at 14. However, the Supreme Court has consistently 
refused to impose an affirmative duty on government to protect the health of its citizens. See Town of 
Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005) (finding that a state mandatory arrest statute did not 
impose an affirmative duty on the police to arrest); DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 
489 U.S. 189, 191 (1989) (holding that the government had no affirmative duty to protect a child from 
an abusive father even though the social services department knew of the abusive relationship and failed 
to take steps to prevent further injury); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 507 (1989) 
(rejecting a claim that government had obligation to provide health services stating that “[o]ur cases 
have recognized that the Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to government aid, 
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determine what is unhealthy and how to regulate it, but that power is 
limited by constitutional protections of individual liberty.91 
B.   Federal Government’s Powers Under the Commerce Clause 
The federal government’s primary power to promote public health 
stems from the Commerce Clause.92 Initially, public health powers 
fell exclusively to the states as a result of a narrower understanding 
of the Commerce Clause.93 Since the early 1900’s, however, the 
Supreme Court has interpreted the Commerce Clause broadly, 
thereby giving Congress the authority to regulate virtually every 
activity that has a “substantial and harmful effect” on interstate 
commerce.94 This has enabled Congress to usurp many traditional 
state police powers.95 
In recent cases, however, the Supreme Court has limited the scope 
of the Commerce Clause to those activities that are inherently 
                                                                                                                 
even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the 
government itself may not deprive the individual.”) (quoting Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 196). 
 91. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 25; Gostin, Public’s Health, supra note 66, at 15. Constitutional limits on 
public health police powers will be developed infra Part II.C. 
 92. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; PUBLIC HEALTH LAW & ETHICS, supra 
note 66, at 118. Additionally, the government may influence healthy behavior using tax relief to 
encourage healthy activity and tax burdens to discourage risky behavior. Gostin, Public’s Health, supra 
note 66, at 13. See also South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 205, 211–12 (1987) (holding that Congress 
may condition receipt of tax funds on states enacting drinking-age legislation to promote the general 
health and welfare). Also, Congress may enforce the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth civil rights 
amendments to promote scientific progress. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, 
XIV, XV. It also gives the President power to make treaties with other nations. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, 
cl. 2. All of these activities can be used in the advancement of public health aims. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW 
& ETHICS, supra note 66, at 118 (describing the various ways Congress may promote public health). 
 93. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 203, 205–06 (emphasizing that quarantine and inspection laws are health 
laws and not commerce, and are the exclusive power of the states); Epstein, supra note 5, at 1431–32. 
 94. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257–58 (1964) (holding Title II of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, outlawing discrimination in the hospitality industry, to be constitutional 
even though it legislated “moral wrongs” because of the “disruptive effect that racial discrimination has 
had on commercial intercourse”); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 123–24, 125, 127–28 (1942) 
(upholding regulation imposing wheat growth quotas on an individual not growing for sale because “his 
contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated” effects interstate commerce in a 
way that “is far from trivial”); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 31–32 (1937) 
(construing the National Labor Relations Act as constitutional because it governed activities “affecting” 
interstate commerce); Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 190, 189–90, 196 (defining commerce to mean “intercourse 
between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches,” and holding that Congressional power to 
regulate that commerce “may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other 
than are prescribed in the constitution”). 
 95. GOSTIN, POWER, supra note 7, at 105. 
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economic even if enacted to promote a social cause, but not to social 
or moral activities.96 Therefore, Congressional action to promote 
public health falls under the authority of the Commerce Clause as 
long as Congress purports to regulate an “economic endeavor.”97 
C.   Early Limitation of Government Authority: Jacobson v. 
Massachusetts 
The turn of the nineteenth century marked the rise of public health 
consciousness in America.98 During that time, public health 
departments were professionalized and the menacing threat of 
infectious diseases began to abate.99 Meanwhile, debate over 
compulsory vaccination raged in the media and in the state courts.100 
The United States Supreme Court stepped into the fray and handed 
down the most influential decision in public health law: Jacobson v. 
                                                                                                                 
 96. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (holding that the Gun Free School Zones act 
exceeded Congressional authority because it had “nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of 
economic enterprise” and is “not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity”); United 
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609–11 (2000) (striking the civil remedy provision of the Violence 
Against Women Act because gender-motivated crimes are not activities of an “economic nature” even 
though they may have economic consequences). 
 97. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609–11; GOSTIN, POWER, supra note 7, at 105–06. The enactment of the 
1906 Pure Food and Drug Act, the precursor to the 1938 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which 
created the FDA, was premised on Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce. George W. Evans 
& Arnold I. Friede, The Food and Drug Administration’s Regulation of Prescription Drug 
Manufacturer Speech: A First Amendment Analysis, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 365, 373–74 (2003). 
 98. PARMET, POPULATIONS, supra note 25, at 38 (describing the turn of the nineteenth century as the 
“zenith” of public health’s influence and citing examples). 
 99. Id. (describing the professionalization of public health departments and its impact on infections 
disease, and the “epidemiological transition” in which chronic diseases such as cancer and coronary 
heart disease replaced infectious diseases as a major cause of death). 
 100. GOSTIN, POWER, supra note 7, at 122. Anti-vaccination activists called compulsory smallpox 
vaccinations the “greatest crime of the age” which “slaughter[s] tens of thousands of innocent children.” 
Id. (quoting Vaccine is a Crime: Porter Cope of Philadelphia, Claims It Is the Only Cause of Smallpox, 
WASH. POST, July 29, 1905). The mainstream press called the debate “a conflict between intelligence 
and ignorance, civilization and barbarism” and labeled anti-vaccinationists “familiar species of crank.” 
Id. (quoting Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1885 and The Anti-Vaccinationists’ Triumph, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 18, 1898). Additionally, the state courts were “heavily engaged in the vaccination controversy” 
even prior to Jacobson. Id. 
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Massachusetts.101 The genesis of American public health law, 
Jacobson enlightens debate to this day.102 
In an effort to combat a smallpox outbreak, the city of Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, acting on expressed statutory authority, enacted a 
regulation requiring all citizens to receive the smallpox vaccine.103 A 
local Lutheran pastor, Henning Jacobson, whose minority religion 
influenced his alignment with anti-vaccination groups, refused free 
vaccination.104 He was criminally charged and fined five dollars.105 
Jacobson challenged his conviction in Massachusetts courts asserting 
that “a compulsory vaccination law is unreasonable, arbitrary, and 
oppressive, and, therefore, hostile to the inherent right of every 
freeman to care for his own body and health in such way as to him 
seems best . . . .”106 The Massachusetts court ruled against him, 
                                                                                                                 
 101. See generally Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). See also PARMET, POPULATIONS, 
supra note 25, at 38 (describing Jacobson as the Supreme Court’s “most important case concerning a 
core public health law”). 
 102. See Wendy E. Parmet, Richard A. Goodman, & Amy Farber, Individual Rights Versus the Public 
Health—100 Years After Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 652, 652, 654 (2005) 
[hereinafter Parmet, Individual Rights] (arguing that physicians, policymakers, and public health 
officials should consider lessons learned from Jacobson when using law to promote public health such 
as the importance of considering the different views of diverse social groups to gain widespread 
acceptance for public health intervention). See also Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 970–72 (2000) 
(Kennedy, J. dissenting) (citing Jacobson to argue that the legislature only need show common belief of 
medical knowledge to justify “tak[ing] sides in a medical debate” about partial birth abortions); Boone 
v. Boozman, 217 F.Supp.2d 938, 955–56 (E.D. Ark. 2002) (using Jacobson’s holding to uphold a 
mandatory vaccination statute and holding that Jacobson is relevant even according to modern 
substantive due process doctrine until otherwise overruled by the Supreme Court). 
 103. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 12. The statute provided: “[T]he board of health of a city or town, if, in its 
opinion, it is necessary for the public health or safety, shall require and enforce the vaccination and 
revaccination of all the inhabitants thereof, and shall provide them with the means of free vaccination.” 
Id. The Cambridge regulation stated: 
Whereas, smallpox has been prevalent to some extent in the city of Cambridge, and still 
continues to increase; and whereas, it is necessary for the speedy extermination of the 
disease that all persons not protected by vaccination should be vaccinated; and whereas, 
in the opinion of the board, the public health and safety require the vaccination or 
revaccination of all the inhabitants of Cambridge; be it ordered, that all the inhabitants 
habitants [sic] of the city who have not been successfully vaccinated since March 1st, 
1897, be vaccinated or revaccinated. 
Id. at 12–13. 
 104. Parmet, Individual Rights, supra note 102, at 653 (noting that Jacobson’s minority religious 
status may have played a role in his disagreement with the Board of Health, and suggesting that doctors’ 
discriminatory attitudes toward “Italians, negroes and other employees” undermined public trust in the 
vaccination program). 
 105. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 12–13. 
 106. Id. at 26. 
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finding that the enactment advanced the public health in a way that 
was not arbitrary or capricious and was within the state’s 
constitutional power.107 In affirming the lower court’s ruling, Justice 
Harlan created the legal framework by which public health initiatives 
are evaluated.108 
Lawrence O. Gostin distilled the analysis into five standards: 
necessity, proportionality, harm avoidance, fairness, and most 
importantly, reasonable means.109 
1.   Necessity 
Justice Harlan emphasized that state police powers are authorized 
only if necessary to the case.110 He notes that a community may use 
means to protect itself which “might be exercised in particular 
circumstances and in reference to particular persons in such an 
arbitrary, unreasonable manner, or might go so far beyond what was 
reasonably required for the safety of the public, as to authorize or 
compel the courts to interfere for the protection of such persons.”111 
Therefore, government can only compel behavior if it is acting “in 
the face of a demonstrable health threat.”112 However, the Court only 
requires “what the people believe is for the common welfare must be 
accepted as tending to promote the common welfare, whether it does 
in fact or not,”113 and does not appear to require the government to 
justify its actions with scientific, epidemiologic, or medical 
                                                                                                                 
 107. Commonwealth. v. Pear, 66 N.E. 719, 721−22 (Mass. 1903), aff’d, Jacobson, 197 U.S. 11. 
Deferential treatment to public health agencies was typical of state courts’ treatment of mandatory 
vaccination laws. See, e.g., Blue v. Beach, 56 N.E. 89, 91 (Ind. 1900) (holding courts have no concern 
as to the effectiveness of the smallpox vaccine); Morris v. City of Columbus, 30 S.E. 850, 851–52 (Ga. 
1898) (holding that the right to compel vaccination is based on necessity, and outbreak nearby towns 
justified compelling vaccinations); Bissel v. Davison, 32 A. 348, 349−50 (Conn. 1894) (permitting 
public schools to require vaccination as a prerequisite for admission). 
 108. See GOSTIN, POWER, supra note 7, at 130 (noting that federal and state courts have consistently 
affirmed Jacobson’s holding and reasoning, and that it endures as a reasonable formulation of the 
boundaries between individual and collective interests). 
 109. See id. at 126–28. Since Jacobson, the Supreme Court upheld regulations of food, milk, and 
sanitation on the same principle. GOSTIN, POWER, supra note 7, at 126. 
 110. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 28. 
 111. Id. (emphasis added). 
 112. GOSTIN, POWER, supra note 7, at 127. 
 113. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 35 (quoting Viemeister v. White, 72 N.E. 97 (N.Y. 1904)). 
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evidence.114 Courts have emphasized that deference must be given to 
the legislature in making the determinations of what is necessary to 
reach a public health objective.115 
2.   Proportionality 
Additionally, public health officials cannot overreach in ways that 
invade personal autonomy unnecessarily.116 Although the police 
powers may be used to promote public health in a manner that 
burdens individuals, the Court held that a regulation is 
unconstitutional if it imposes a harm that is disproportionate to the 
benefit expected.117 This creates a “balancing test” between the 
public good and the degree of intervention.118 
3.   Harm Avoidance 
Further, Justice Harlan emphasized that Jacobson would not be 
injured or harmed by the immunization,119 but if a public health 
                                                                                                                 
 114. GOSTIN, POWER, supra note 7, at 559–60 n.48. Nonetheless, Wendy E. Parmet points out that 
“the Court’s opinion contained extensive citations to historical and statistical data . . . . Thus, the Court 
effectively endorsed the use of epidemiological evidence to determine the appropriateness of the state’s 
action.” PARMET, POPULATIONS supra note 25, at 39–40. 
 115. S.C. State Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 190–91 (1938) (holding that 
when a legislative action is within the police power “fairly debatable questions as to its reasonableness, 
wisdom, and propriety are not for the determination of courts, but for the legislative body”). Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, in her Burwell dissent, appears to defer to the legislative findings in determining 
whether the contraceptive mandate is a public health need. See Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2788 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
 116. GOSTIN, POWER, supra note 7, at 127 (“Public health authorities have a constitutional 
responsibility not to overreach in ways that unnecessarily invade personal spheres of autonomy.”). 
 117. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 38 (holding that the police powers exercised by legislature or local elected 
officials “may be exerted in such circumstances, or by regulations so arbitrary and oppressive in 
particular cases, as to justify the interference of the courts to prevent wrong and oppression.”). 
 118. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (noting that Jacobson “balanced 
an individual’s liberty” against the “State’s interest in preventing disease”); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 
361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960) (holding that only a “compelling” state interest justifies “significant 
encroachment upon personal liberty”). 
 119. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 36–37. Although Jacobson offered to prove that vaccination can cause 
injury or death and the results of a vaccination were not always certain, Justice Harlan dismissed these 
claims because Jacobson did not prove that “he was in fact not a fit subject of vaccination . . . .” Id. The 
obvious inference from Justice Harlan’s reasoning is that if one could show that a public health 
intervention would cause an individual actual harm the intervention may be beyond the scope of 
governmental authority. GOSTIN, POWER, supra note 7, at 127. The court, in fact, clarified that the 
holding was limited to a subject who is “perfect[ly] health[y] and a fit subject of vaccination,” but was 
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intervention would cause serious harm to its subject, it would not 
pass constitutional muster. 120 Subsequent lower court cases reiterated 
this condition, emphasizing that public health powers are designed to 
promote the common good and not punish individuals.121 
4.   Fairness 
Two previous cases in the same time period added a new 
requirement: fairness.122 In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court 
struck down a San Francisco ordinance prohibiting clothes-washing 
in wooden buildings, because it was discriminatorily enforced against 
Chinese owners.123 Similarly, in Jew Ho v. Williamson, public health 
authorities in San Francisco quarantined an entire district known as 
Chinatown due to an outbreak of bubonic plague, yet only enforced 
the quarantine against people of Chinese nationality.124 The district 
court held the intervention unconstitutional because it was enforced 
with “an evil eye and an unequal hand.”125 
5.   Reasonable Means 
The last requirement of the Jacobson court is that a public health 
agency, when acting in response to a threat, may only use methods 
that have a “substantial relation” to ameliorating the harm, and those 
means cannot be “a plain, palpable invasion of rights.”126 This creates 
a means/ends test, requiring a reasonable relationship between the 
                                                                                                                 
not addressing the issue of one for whom vaccination would “seriously impair his health, or probably 
cause his death.” Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 39. 
 120. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 39 (clarifying that the court was not holding that an absolute rule requiring 
vaccination regardless of the fitness of the subject would be constitutional). 
 121. GOSTIN, POWER, supra note 7, at 128. See, e.g., Kirk v. Wyman, 83 S.E. 387, 391 (S.C. 1909) 
(holding public health authorities are required to provide safe and habitable conditions to individuals in 
isolation). 
 122. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F. 10, 12–13 (N.D. Cal. 
1900); Gostin, Public’s Health, supra note 66, at 128 (adding the “fairness” requirement to public health 
analysis based on these cases). 
 123. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373–74 (finding law banning laundries in wooden buildings targeted at the 
Chinese population unconstitutional because the law was applied in an “unequal and oppressive” way 
and were enacted to close down Chinese business). 
 124. Jew Ho, 103 F. at 12–13. 
 125. Id. at 23. 
 126. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31 (1905). 
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intervention and the objective.127 This requirement has garnered 
much debate in modern public health law, focusing on how direct the 
causation must be between the means and the end.128 
D.   Standard of Review: Smith and the Religious Freedom and 
Restoration Act 
Although the Jacobson Court established the framework to 
determine whether a public health interest is an appropriate use of 
government power, modern day jurisprudence requires an additional 
consideration: standard of review.129 Focusing on the reasonable 
means test described above, the outcome of a modern-day challenge 
to a public health initiative will depend greatly on the standard of 
review.130 In other words, if the standard of review requires a 
compelling interest, a public health initiative may not stand, even if 
the government was acting to advance a valid aim.131 
The contraceptive mandate implicates religious freedom concerns, 
so a discussion of First Amendment Free Exercise doctrine is crucial 
to determine its appropriateness.132 In a 1990 case, Employment Div. 
                                                                                                                 
 127. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 510–11 (1934) (“[T]he guaranty of due process, as has often 
been held, demands . . . the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought 
to be attained.”); Cal. Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U.S. 306, 318–19 (1905) (citing 
Jacobson for the notion that courts should not strike down a regulation that has a “real, substantial 
relation” to the objective trying to be reached). 
 128. See Hall, supra note 3, at S207 (arguing against the belief that public health can tackle issues 
because that moves the discipline beyond the “pathogenic model” which targets specific agents that 
threaten health in “a direct and clear causal path”). For example, mandatory seat belt use is only justified 
because there is a “discrete intervention whose effectiveness is beyond dispute.” Id. at S208. 
 129. GOSTIN, POWER, supra note 7, at 138 (2nd ed. 2008) (indicating that the level of review will 
dictate how the court balances competing interests and how much deference the court gives to public 
health legislation). 
 130. Id. at 128. 
 131. Id. at 141 (explaining that under strict scrutiny, a government entity must show a “compelling 
interest . . . between means and ends” and that there were no less restrictive means). Some of the 
Jacobson criteria are included into the strict scrutiny test but only create a floor for court scrutiny. Id. 
 132. See Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 724 
F.3d 377, 407–15 (3rd Cir. 2013) (Jordan, J., dissenting); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 
F.3d 1114, 1143–45 (10th Cir. 2013). While the main controversy in these cases surrounds whether a 
corporate entity may or may not assert a religious freedom claim, a sub-issue in the cases is whether the 
public health interests are sufficiently compelling. See Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 407–15 (Jordan, J., 
dissenting); Hobby Lobby Stores, 723 F.3d at 1143–45. A resolution of this sub-issue may affect future 
public health legislation even if the Supreme Court were to find that a corporation cannot assert a free 
exercise claim. 
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v. Smith,133 the Supreme Court modified free-exercise jurisprudence 
and ruled that “neutral laws of general applicability” that are 
otherwise valid exercises of a state’s police powers are constitutional, 
and an individual is not relieved from complying with them.134 The 
Court rejected the use of strict scrutiny for general, neutral laws135 
and embraced a “rational basis” test on actions burdening religion.136 
In response to Smith, Congress passed the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).137 The purpose of the Act was to 
restore the “compelling interest” test that the Court expressly rejected 
in Smith.138 The Act imposes a two-part test in assessing a rule of 
general applicability: (1) it must further a compelling interest and (2) 
it must use the least restrictive means to do so.139 Although the 
Supreme Court has held RFRA to be unconstitutional when applied 
to state and local government,140 the Court has applied RFRA to rule 
in favor of religious freedom in at least one case against the federal 
government: Gonzales v. O Centro Esprita Beneficente Uniao do 
Vegetal.141 This strict scrutiny standard requires the federal 
                                                                                                                 
 133. 494 U.S. 872, 872 (1990). 
 134. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 901 (1990); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, 1303 (4th ed. 2011) (stating that Smith expressly 
changed the law). The case centered around Alfred Smith and Galen Black, Native Americans in 
Oregon, who challenged an Oregon statute prohibiting use of “peyote,” a “controlled substance,” which 
they used for ritual purposes. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874. Conviction caused them to lose employment and 
unemployment benefits. Id. 
 135. Smith, 494 U.S. at 888. The court distinguished previous free exercise challenges that seemed to 
point the other direction because all those cases involved a synthesis of claims, whereas Smith involved 
only a free exercise claim. Id. 
 136. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 134, at 1304. 
 137. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012). 
 138. Id. at (b)(1) (declaring the purpose of the statute to “restore the compelling interest test as set 
forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) . . . .”). 
 139. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2012). 
 140. Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997) (finding the RFRA unconstitutional). The city of 
Boerne, Texas denied a building permit to a Catholic Church because it was deemed a historic 
landmark. Id. at 512. The church challenged the ordinance designating the area a historic district under 
the RFRA. Id. 
 141. See generally Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
A religious sect that used a controlled substance to make a ritual tea challenged the Controlled 
Substances Act under the RFRA. Id. at 418. The court applied strict scrutiny to rule in favor of the 
religious group. Id. at 419–20. Specifically, the court found that “mere invocation of the general 
characteristics” is insufficient. Id. at 420. Although the court did not specifically address the 
constitutionality of the act in the context of the federal government, the unanimous ruling relied on its 
validity. Id. at 419–20. 
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government to show a “tight relationship between means and ends” 
and that there is no less restrictive means when advancing a public 
health initiative that intrudes on religious freedom.142 Also, the Court 
held that the government must go beyond “mere invocation of the 
general characteristics” and must “show with more particularity” how 
an even strong interest is adversely affected by a religious 
exemption.143 
In sum, according to the Jacobson framework of public health 
analysis, five questions should be asked: (1) Does the public good 
outweigh the invasion into personal autonomy?144 (2) Is the 
government initiative “necessary for the safety of the public”?145 (3) 
Does the action cause significant harm to the individual?146 (4) Was 
the initiative adopted in a way that reflects “an evil eye and an 
unequal hand”?147 (5) Does the legislation represent the most 
reasonable means by which to accomplish the goal?148 Under this 
framework, arguments for or against a government public health 
measure must focus on clear public health legal doctrine.149 A lack of 
analytical framework lends itself to speculation not grounded in facts 
or statistical analysis and does not provide judges with a way to 
evaluate public health initiatives.150 Much of the decision-making is 
in danger of being left to policy-based or political discretion. Rather 
than assuming away the issue, Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, or Justice 
Alito could have made strong arguments against the compelling 
interest of the contraceptive mandate. 
                                                                                                                 
 142. GOSTIN, POWER, supra note 7, at 141. 
 143. O Centro, 546 U.S. at 431–32 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 236 (1972)). 
 144. See supra Part III.C.2. 
 145. See supra Part III.C.1. 
 146. See supra Part III.C.3. 
 147. See supra Part III.C.4. 
 148. See supra Part III.C.5. 
 149. See Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 686 (7th Cir. 2013). The courts, in fact, seemed to imply 
that if the Obama administration would have engaged in a more rigorous public health argument, 
perhaps a compelling interest would have been found. See id. (stating that the issue is “contestable and 
contested” and the government was guaranteed to “flunk the test” because they stated the aims to 
broadly). 
 150. See, e.g., Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 733 F.3d 1208, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 
2013). In fact, in Gilardi, the majority opinion holds that a compelling scientific public health interest is 
not present; whereas, the dissent claims that the mandate “obviously serves the compelling interests of 
promoting public health, welfare, and gender equality.” Id. at 1220, at 1239. 
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IV.   IS THE MANDATE REALLY COMPELLING? WHAT THE COURT 
COULD HAVE FOUND 
In most contexts, the public health doctrine requires courts to 
balance the harms of an action against the expected benefits.151 
However, when legislation implicates religious freedom, the RFRA 
statutorily requires more than just proportionality: it requires a 
“compelling interest.”152 With regard to the contraceptive mandate, 
three of the lower courts found that it does not promote a compelling 
government interest as required by the RFRA as interpreted in O 
Centro.153 In Burwell, the Supreme Court appears to agree.154 The 
Court said that RFRA requires a “more focused” inquiry, and HHS 
only asserted “very broadly framed interests.”155 The Court did not, 
however, engage in a rigorous public health legal analysis but 
preferred to assume away this issue and decide the case on other 
grounds.156 Had the Court analyzed the issue through the lens of the 
Jacobson factors presented above,157 perhaps it would have revealed 
                                                                                                                 
 151. See supra Part III.C.2. 
 152. See supra Part III.D. 
 153. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 544 U.S. 418 (2006); Korte v. 
Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 686 (7th Cir. 2013); Gilardi, 733 F.3d at 1220; Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. 
Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1142 (10th Cir. 2013). In Hobby Lobby Stores, the court held that the 
government’s interest to promote public health and inequality were too broadly formulated to withstand 
a compelling interest test. Hobby Lobby Stores, 723 F.3d at 1143. Similarly, in Gilardi, the court held 
the government merely recited public health justifications that were “sketchy and highly abstract.” 
Gilardi, 733 F.3d at 1220. Lastly, in Korte, the court found that the governmental interests were stated 
“at such a high level of generality” that “the government guarantees that the mandate will flunk the 
test.” Korte, 735 F.3d at 686. 
 154. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2779 (2014). See also id. at 2800 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that even the majority opinion “stepp[ed] back from its assumption 
that compelling interests support the contraceptive coverage requirement”). 
 155. Id. at 2779. 
 156. Id. at 2780. See Epstein, supra note 24, at 51 (criticizing Justice Samuel Alito’s Burwell decision 
for assuming “that the advancement of ‘women’s health’ was a compelling state interest that warranted 
the imposition of the contraceptive mandate against Hobby Lobby”). The lower courts did not assume 
the issue. For example, the Gilardi court appears to analyze the public health claims but does not utilize 
any sort of legal framework in doing so. Gilardi, 732 F.3d at 1220. Rather, it asserts that the 
government’s failure to acknowledge the “tug-of-war” of scientific evidence “gives us pause.” Id. at 
1221. In Korte, the court asserts that the lack of evidence as to the least restrictive means implies that “it 
is nearly impossible” to justify the public health interests but does not engage in analysis of the public 
health aims. Korte, 735 F.3d at 686. 
 157. See supra Part III.C. 
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that the contraceptive mandate is not as compelling as its proponents 
make it seem.158 
When applying judicial scrutiny, the court will uphold a neutral 
law of general applicability even if it burdens certain religious 
groups’ practices.159 As long as the religious group is not targeted for 
punishment or motivated by a desire to interfere with religion, the 
law is constitutional.160 In a similar vein, the Wick-Ho requirement of 
fairness is only transgressed if the law is designed to specifically 
target a racial or religious group or is only enforced against one of 
these groups.161 The mandate, therefore, cannot be attacked for being 
applied in a discriminatory fashion. Although religious groups may 
be adversely affected by it, the law applies to all for-profit employers 
without distinction.162 
Nonetheless, the mandate is not “necessary” in the legal sense of 
the term. In the classic construct of public health doctrine, 
government is only entitled to act in the “face of a demonstrable 
health threat” and even then may only able to do what is necessary 
for the safety of the public.163 The Jacobson Court likely did not 
envision the broad view that many scholars would eventually take of 
public health because the doctrine at that time focused only on 
addressing immediate health threats.164 
In the context of the contraceptive mandate, the supporters show 
some connection between contraceptive coverage and a decrease in 
unwanted pregnancies, but they hardly show a “necessity.”165 First, 
                                                                                                                 
 158. See Epstein, supra note 24, at 51–53. 
 159. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (upholding a neutral ban 
on peyote even though the hallucinogenic substance was required by Native Americans for religious 
reasons because it was a rule of “general applicability”). 
 160. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531–32 (1993) (declaring a 
city ordinance banning ritual sacrifice unconstitutional because it was enacted with the purpose of 
restricted religious practice). 
 161. See supra Part III.C.4. 
 162. See 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(B) (2013) (carving out religious exemption only for non-profit 
religious institutions). 
 163. See supra Part III.C.1; GOSTIN, POWER, supra note 7, at 127. 
 164. See Epstein, supra note 5, at 1425 (describing the original, more limited view of public health). 
Similarly, “[t]he global interest in public health and safety may justify the general control of the street 
and commercial use of drugs under the Controlled Substances Act, but it hardly justifies the restriction 
as it applies to the ingestion of peyote as part of a religious rite.” Epstein, supra note 24, at 52. 
 165. See supra Part I.A.2. 
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as opponents point out, contraception is readily available through 
various government programs and yet it is still considered a public 
health crisis.166 Arguably the issue is not the availability of 
contraceptive methods but rather a dearth in education on 
contraception use and responsible sexual behavior. Second, the 
provision of free contraception through employer-based insurance 
may not be compelling because there are other ways of affecting a 
decrease in unwanted pregnancies such as tax deductions for 
contraceptive purchases, expansion of federal programs under 
Medicaid or Title X of the Public Health Services Act, government 
reimbursement for contraception, or incentives for drug companies to 
provide contraceptives to healthcare providers free of charge.167 
Lastly, leaving the religiously controversial contraceptives out of the 
mandate would not frustrate the larger goals because those who do 
not oppose all forms of contraception could still provide forms they 
hold permissible.168 Therefore, it is difficult to argue that forcing 
businesses to provide the three controversial methods is necessary. 
Further, the government can only enforce a public health initiative 
if the methods used substantially relate to the aim the government 
attempts to achieve.169 Therefore, in assessing an initiative, courts 
look for a strong causative nexus between the action being 
undertaken and the harm the government attempts to ameliorate.170 
The contraceptive mandate claims to achieve a decrease in unwanted 
pregnancies and a corresponding increase the health of families and 
                                                                                                                 
 166. See supra note 53. 
 167. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2781–82 (2014); Conestoga Wood 
Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 414 (3rd Cir. 2013) 
(Jordan, J., dissenting) (quoting Appellant’s Brief at 51); Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 733 F.3d 1208, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 2013). The government did not assert why any of these options 
would be unworkable. Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 415. Although these considerations go to the last prong of 
the test—the “least restrictive means”—they may also show of a lack of necessity in creating a 
compelling interest for a contraceptive mandate. See Epstein, supra note 24, at 52–53. 
 168. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1144 (10th Cir. 2013). This argument may 
not satisfy some religious objectors who believe every form of contraception is prohibited. 
 169. See supra Part III.C.5. 
 170. Id. 
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mothers.171 Unfortunately, it falls short of achieving the desired 
nexus.172 
First, even though the IOM report claims that access to 
contraception will improve family health, statistical evidence falls 
short of proving causation between contraceptive coverage and a 
decrease in unwanted pregnancies.173 Second, even assuming that 
there is a relation between contraceptive coverage and unwanted 
pregnancy, no causation is apparent between a decrease in unwanted 
pregnancy and improved family health.174 The report merely 
demonstrates a correlative relationship.175 As opponents argue, 
predisposition to risk-taking may account for both increased 
instances of unwanted pregnancy and other health conditions such as 
smoking, drinking, and obtaining substandard medical care for 
children.176 Perhaps the Court would have been more willing to let 
the mandate stand if HHS had shown that it relied on stronger 
scientific or epidemiological sources than the IOM report in 
fashioning the mandate or if the IOM based its report on stronger 
evidence showing a causative nexus. But, because that was not 
possible, the Court could not have found a compelling interest to 
exist. 
Further, in the issue before the Jacobson Court, the focus was on 
the physical harm that a public health action could inflict on 
individuals.177 One of the underlying principles in the Jacobson 
decision is that public health initiatives should be designed to 
promote the common good and not to punish individuals.178 As the 
Court points out, from the perspective of religious individuals, the 
contraceptive mandate could cause catastrophic harm.179 Although 
the business owners are not being forced to actually take the 
                                                                                                                 
 171. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 172. See Gilardi, 732 F.3d at 1220 (“But the government does little to demonstrate a nexus between 
this array of issues and the mandate.”). 
 173. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text. 
 174. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text. 
 175. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text. 
 176. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text. 
 177. See supra Part III.C.3. 
 178. See supra Part III.C.3. 
 179. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775–76 (2014). 
28
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 4
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol31/iss3/4
2015] A COMPELLING INTEREST 641 
contraceptives, the Gilardi court notes that according to Catholic 
doctrine, “instructing or encouraging someone else to commit a 
wrongful act is itself a grave moral wrong—i.e., ‘scandal’—under 
Catholic doctrine,” and “the Mandate thrusts Catholic employers into 
a ‘perfect storm’ of moral complicity in the forbidden actions.”180 
Although the Burwell dissent takes the position that “the connection 
between the families’ religious objections and the contraceptive 
coverage requirement is too attenuated to rank as substantial,”181 the 
majority strongly argues that such an inquiry is irrelevant.182 RFRA 
asks the court to answer whether the mandate imposes a substantial 
burden on “their religious beliefs” and not to question whether those 
sincerely held beliefs are right or wrong.183 It is not the place of the 
courts to speculate as to the “moral responsibility” of a sin, but rather 
the court must be sensitive the religious beliefs of the individual.184 
Additionally, the mandate imposes such a heavy fine on businesses 
that cannot comply because of their religious beliefs that it 
effectively puts religious business owners in an impossible situation 
where they are forced to choose between violating their religious 
convictions and facing irreparable harm.185 Alternatively, in cases 
like Burwell, the mandate would force a religious individual to make 
a choice as to which religious belief he will follow.186 Although the 
purpose of the penalty is to incentivize compliance, it effectively 
punishes religious business owners who cannot, in good conscience, 
                                                                                                                 
 180. Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 733 F.3d 1208, 1215 (D.C. Cir. 2013) 
(quoting Br. of Catholic Theologians at 3, 5). 
 181. Burwell, 124 S. Ct. at 2799. The dissent argues that the “requirement carries no command that 
Hobby Lobby or Conestoga purchase or provide the contraceptives they find objectionable. Instead, it 
calls on the companies . . . to direct money into undifferentiated funds that finance a wide variety of 
benefits under comprehensive health plans.” Id. 
 182. Id. at 2778. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Gilardi, 732 F.3d at 1215 (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 n. 12 (1982)). 
 185. See 26 U.S.C.A § 4980D(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-125 (excluding P.L. 113-121)) 
(imposing a tax of “$100 for each day in the noncompliance period with respect to each individual to 
whom such failure relates”); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1146–47 (10th Cir. 
2013) (describing the business owner’s predicament as a “Hobson’s choice”). 
 186. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2776–77 (noting that the companies were religiously obliged to provide 
health insurance to their employees, and asking them to not provide health insurance at all would be a 
violation of their religion). 
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comply. This Hobson’s choice is precisely the sort of religious 
freedom RFRA is designed to protect. 
CONCLUSION 
Public health law remains a hotly debated subject, socially and 
politically charged from both right and left. In its attempt to provide 
proper preventative healthcare, the Obama Administration 
overstepped its bounds with the HHS Mandate, representing a classic 
case of government overreach into the religious liberty of its citizens. 
The Administration disguised the Mandate as a public health 
initiative. Nonetheless, it failed to provide concrete justification for 
the invasion on individual liberty, indicating that the purpose was 
less to promote the common good and more to advance a political or 
social agenda at the expense of religious freedom. 
The judicial system is tasked with developing an objective 
framework based on judicial precedent to evaluate public health 
initiatives. This framework provides proponents with a predictable 
framework with which they can advocate their cause and religious 
and social minorities with the necessary tools to defend themselves 
against inappropriate government coercion. Although the Supreme 
Court in Burwell chose not to provide that framework, a return to the 
Jacobson paradigm would provide that direction. 
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